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Hetherington has recently argued that psychology's concern with anecdotal evidence, introspective data and rare or one-off events renders the methodology and explanatory model of the natural sciences inappropriate and inadequate; and as such psychology needs to develop its own methods of inquiry. However, an examination of his arguments reveals that psychological data do not require explanation of a radically different kind from that employed in the natural sciences. Hetherington is correct in emphasizing that what is distinctive about the subject matter of psychology is its concern with intentional content; however, the conclusions he draws about the special nature of psychological explanation are unwarranted.


Journal article


Br J Med Psychol

Publication Date



58 ( Pt 1)


19 - 24


Behavior, Humans, Logic, Psychology, Science