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Enesco and Delval carefully evaluate the success of modular theories amongst developmental psychologists. They begin by reviewing the core characteristics of Fodorian modules with reference to language as a primary example and their more recent revisions. They then examine empirical evidence and alternative theoretical accounts that currently question massively modular interpretations of evolutionary psychology, human infant cognition and developmental disorders. The present commentary draws primarily from the latter source of evidence, developmental disorders, to complement and discuss the arguments presented by the authors. I focus particularly on the importance of understanding mechanisms of atypical developmental change and then briefly highlight some questions for both modular and non-modular theories. © 2006 by Fundación Infancia y Aprendizaje.

Original publication




Journal article


Infancia y Aprendizaje

Publication Date





281 - 287